Myanmar has faced severe electricity blackouts since the military coup in 2021, compounding the stress of disrupted lives and businesses for people living under the regime. The power crisis began with a collapse in foreign financing and currency stability, driven by the political volatility created by the coup. This led to the LNG plants used for electrification ceasing operations, including two large Chinese-backed projects in Yangon. The junta also cancelled 26 solar power projects approved by the ousted government.
Later, intensified conflict affected the power grid, transmission lines, and several onshore oil fields. These problems, combined with the regime’s prioritization of military zones for electrification, left major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay with around eight hours of daily electricity access. Millions in other townships suffer even worse conditions, and many areas outside the regime’s territorial control have been cut off from the national grid entirely.
Efforts to address the electricity crisis have faded due to the lack of foreign investment, deteriorating infrastructure, political instability, and competing regime interests. Over the past two years, the military junta has also been forced onto the back foot, losing considerable amounts of territory to an alliance of ethnic armed groups and People’s Defense Forces during Operation 1027, an offensive launched in late 2023. Up until this point, the junta paid little attention to the national energy sector and the electricity crisis. However, after China began to put weight on the junta and backed its planned election, the regime gained significant political support from China and appeared to steer its energy policy in a more politicized and strategically driven direction.
The largest source of foreign currency for the military junta, accounting for approximately 50 percent, comes from the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is estimated to earn more than $2 billion annually. Offshore natural gas fields remain the primary source of revenue for MOGE, around 75 percent of the output, which is exported to China and Thailand. Only the remaining portions of offshore gas and small onshore fields are used domestically. These foreign currency revenues have also been tied to the regime’s arms procurement and ongoing human rights violations, reinforcing how energy exports underpin its capacity to sustain control.
Because of human rights concerns, political instability, and sanctions, major international energy companies have withdrawn from Myanmar since 2021. These include Chevron of the United States, TotalEnergies of France, and Australia’s Woodside. Despite these exits, Thailand’s state-owned PTTEP, Gulf Petroleum Myanmar, China’s CNPC, and Korea’s POSCO International continue to operate in the country in partnership with MOGE.
Since last year, the regime’s authorities have set consistent directions for further natural gas exploration and oil refinery development in order to generate much-needed foreign currency. Oil production has slightly declined over the years, and with ageing infrastructure and reduced foreign investment, junta delegates have continued to seek technology transfer and infrastructure investment from China.
In May of this year, MOGE signed the first offshore production-sharing contract since the coup with Gulf Petroleum Myanmar, a Thai-owned company. The regime-appointed energy minister has also made multiple visits to both Russia and China, seeking cooperation on oil and gas exploration and proposing new projects in potential areas utilizing artificial intelligence and GeoAudit technology from a Russian state-owned company. Despite the challenges of large-scale investment and territorial control over special economic zones in Tanintharyi and Rakhine states, the junta continues to seek opportunities in both offshore and onshore exploration and technology, particularly with Russia and China.
In a related move, the junta leader signed an agreement with Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, in February 2023, signaling a long-term diplomatic strategy with goals that extend beyond energy security. The nuclear cooperation highlights the regime’s interest in deeper political and technological ties with Russia, even as the country struggles to maintain its basic electricity supply and political stability.
By contrast, renewable energy development, necessary for rapid and direct improvement in electricity access, has stalled. Solar tenders have been repeatedly postponed or downsized, and potential hydropower expansion remains uncertain due to environmental concerns and ongoing conflict. These technologies require stable grid management, long-term contracts, and investor confidence, all of which are undermined by political instability and Western sanctions. Although official statements continue to mention renewable energy, it remains unpromising and peripheral to the regime’s current energy strategy.
At its core, the junta appears to be strategizing the energy sector primarily to generate foreign-currency earnings, build closer political ties with Russia and China, and secure support for potential foreign investment following its planned election amid international condemnation. While the military junta benefits from billions of dollars in foreign exchange from oil and gas exports, contributing to reported human rights violations, ordinary citizens have little prospect of gaining from these developments. Instead, they continue to endure economic hardship and daily disruptions under the regime, compounded by limited or no access to electricity while living, quite literally, in the dark.